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tract and equity courses-and quickly. The graduate then out on his own would
at least have a running start toward mastery of his client's problems in the
property area. The further advantage of this approach lies in the cross fertilization of several areas of law in the process of studying a common business
practice. For full effectiveness in a reasonably limited time such a course should
be located in the latter part of the curriculum. This does not propose a trade
school approach or a disregard of theoretical fundamentals, but it does propose a
purposeful attention to the practical application and organization of the training
and knowledge made available and acquired in the law school. In addition this
pattern can provide ample opportunity to consider the adequacy of contemporary practices.
The editors in this second edition make occasional reference to inadequacies
of the present procedures and current attempts to solve the problems. As valuable as any are the references to curative acts, title standards, and marketable
title acts (chapter 9 of part 4). Additional suggestions by the editors of possible
solutions, tried and untried, might well result in more ultimate progress in
property law.
And now for some odds and ends: The chapter on Nuisance is expanded-this
seems to meet a need if the topic is avoided in Torts or Equity; depending on
other courses in the curriculum its omission could be perfectly feasible. The loss
of Pickering v. Moore4 and its confusion of manure will be noticed. It was
usually interesting to observe whether students could handle the case in a
lawyer-like manner. Burial of Jasperson v. Scharnikow5 in a footnote gains this
reviewer's complete approval because the appealing quality of the judge's naive
statement that the idea of "acquiring title by larceny does not go in this country" has caused too much misunderstanding already. That some jurisdictions
are still burdened with the Rule in Shelley's Case could stand a bit of emphasis.
Belief that the different approach suggested above could be more profitable
does not imply a belief of lack of quality in this book; on the contrary, this reviewer believes this to be a good book, following predecessors of high quality.
HiAY M. CRoSs*

Classical Roman Law. By Fritz Schulz. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951.
Pp. xii, 650. $8.50.
The "classical" period, as Romanists call it, of Roman jurisprudence was the
time of the great lawyers who produced that unique treasure of legal literature
on which, in the sixth century A.D., Justinian's compilers drew for the purpose of
putting together the Digest, i.e., the central part of the great codification known
as the Corpu 1uris Civilis. Chronologically, it coincided with the principate or
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earlier imperial period (first through third centuries A.D.). The outlook and
method of the classical lawyers were practical. Both in their work as advisers to
parties, officials and judges and in their literary productions, they analyzed
fact situations in the light of the forms of action which characterized the modes
of procedure which they had inherited from the republican era and which still
prevailed in the city of Rome. Their substantive law was a combination of a set
of traditional institutions and principles, supplemented and partly modified by
statutory law, and of remedies introduced by the jurisdictional magistrates,
chiefly by the praetor, by virtue of their imperium. This dualism is somewhat
comparable to that of English law and equity. In accordance with their background, the classical lawyers were interested chiefly in civil procedure and private law and concentrated upon the law of the city. Neither the legal systems of
other nations living in the Empire nor Roman law as applied in the provinces
(which differed in many respects from that of the city) were heeded by them.
The classical jurists did not create the Roman law. Although the "Edict," a
comprehensive official statement of the actions and other remedies which the
praetor was prepared to grant, did not receive its final shape until the time of
Hadrian (A.D. 117-138), the formative period of Roman law lay almost entirely
before the beginning of its classical era. Nor is the legal system emerging from
Justinian's codification identical with that of the classical epoch. In spite of the
classicist tendencies of the Byzantine emperor and his compilers, the tremendous
changes which occurred during the intervening three centuries as to political,
social, economic, religious and intellectual conditions, as well as the introduction of new modes of judicial procedure, had resulted in altering many maxims
and-more important-the spirit of the law. Nevertheless, it was the classical
lawyers whose practical and literary activities gave the Roman legal system
those qualities of clarity, cohesion, richness and flexibility which both secured
and justified its lasting importance, even though it was received by medieval
Europe only through the medium of Justinian's restatement.
To present Roman classical law as it was at the time of those classical lawyers
-that is to say, as a system of fully developed doctrines not yet corrupted by
the decadence of subsequent times-was the task Professor Robert Schulz (now
of the University of Oxford) set for himself.
After a brief introduction explaining the scope of the work and the method
employed, the book begins with a survey of the types of actions and other procedural remedies through which this law was realized. In view of the strictly
actional character of classical Roman law, the author's decision to include this
material and to have it precede rather than follow the description of the substantive law can only meet with approval. The substantive law is dealt with
under four main headings. The succession of three of them, namely, Part II:
persons and family, Part IV: property, and Part V: obligations, corresponds
roughly to the system used by Gaius, although much that was omitted by Gaius
is of course included by Schulz, and his arrangement of matter within each of
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the main divisions is by no means identical with that of the Roman writer. The
most important deviation from the Gaian scheme is the placement of the law of
succession and wills in Part III, in other words, between family and property.
This may be defensible in view of the intimate link which historically tied the
law of both testate and intestate succession to the structure of the Roman family. In classical times, however, this close connection had long ceased to be true,
and the author, in accordance with the classical approach, conceives the heir
merely as a personal successor to the decedent. One might therefore wonder if it
would not have been more consistent to follow Gaius in treating the law of succession as an annex to the law of property.
The presentation is brief, restricted to essentials, and straightforward, without, as a whole, indulging in polemics or discussion of minute details which
would not interest the nonspecialist. Just the same, the reader receives an
abundance of information. A particularly valuable feature of the book is an
insistence on correct classical terminology. Clear-cut terms, technical and yet
concrete and close to the facts of life, were a characteristic of classical Roman
jurisprudence. The author's conscious effort to point out these expressions has
contributed much to his success in drawing a lucid picture of the logical structure of the Roman legal system. The whole is written in a simple but pleasant
and extremely readable style and is admirable for its clarity of thought and
expression. Further study is stimulated by a judicious selection, attached to
each subdivision of the text, of sources and literature. The bibliography is not
complete but sufficient to enable the student to get fully acquainted with current
opinions and controversies on every problem.
It need not be pointed out that many of the views expressed by Professor
Schulz are controversial, and it is to be expected that some of his theories will be
challenged. We actually possess only a small fraction of what was written on law
in classical times, and our sources are not pure. They were tampered with in
post-classical times, as well as by Justinian's compilers. Therefore what was law
in the classical era cannot be simply derived from the sources as they stand. It
has to be reconstructed, and reconstruction depends on what degree of reliability
as testimonies of classical institutions and modes of thinking we are willing to
accord the sources. Schulz adheres to the more "radical" school of thought in
admitting the presence of spurious elements in extant excerpts from classical
literature, an inclination not fully shared by many scholars.
From this point of view, however, no critical review of the book can and will
be undertaken here. Rather, the reviewer will confine himself to pointing out
some limitations which he feels should be realized in order to gain a proper
perspective of Professor Schulz's book as a whole.
The book describes and explains a historical legal system, but, strictly speaking, it is not a history book. Itpresupposes the reader's familiarity with the facts
of general and constitutional history, as well as with the history of sources and
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civil procedure, which form the background of the institutions discussed.' Nor
are these institutions themselves shown in their historical growth. Almost without exception, they are given in the form in which they appeared in classical
times, without any discussion as to how they came to appear so. Short hints at
differences between the classical law and the law of Justinian are frequent, but
the historical processes by which these changes came about are not explained.
For the most part, this characteristic of the book gives no cause for criticism,
because the proper understanding of the classical law is not impeded by it. Occasionally, however, the author's explanations of classical phenomena are unsatisfactory, in the reviewer's opinion, on account of insufficient attention paid to the
historical situations that produced them.
Thus, Schulz explains the strict formalism for which the Roman law of wills
was notorious on the theory that the pontifices,2 fearing the practical difficulties
arising from an ill-drafted will, wished to compel testators to seek legal advice;
soldiers were, in classical times, relieved of some of the required formalities, but
this is credited to the circumstance that expert advice was often unavailable to
them (p. 249). This utilitarian interpretation conflicts with the fact that the
rigidity of the law of wills was not confined to rules pertaining to the outward
form of wills or to the wording of certain testamentary provisions. For instance,
the rule that a valid will had to begin with the designation of an heir or heirs3
ties in with the rule that the effectiveness of the whole will-that is to say, of
legacies and other provisions-depended on the acceptance of the succession by
the designated heir. The latter principle is certainly not covered by Schulz's
suggestion. Another example, likewise from the law of wills, is the reason given
by the author for the rule which forbade the designation of a secondary heir to
replace the first-called after his death or after a term for years (semel keres
semper heres). This, it is said (p. 262), reflects the liberalism of the Roman jurists
1A detailed account of the historical growth of Roman constitutional and legal institutions
to the time of Justinian may be found in Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of
Roman Law, the third edition of which is about to appear (Cambridge University Press). A
shorter survey, but including medieval and modem developments, is found in the reviewer's
Roman Law, An Historical Introduction (1951). The forms of Roman litigation are the subject of Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure (1940), and the history of the
sources is that of Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (1946). For a discussion of some

underlying attitudes and general aims of the classical jurists, see Schulz, Principles of Roman
Law (1936).
2 They were priests who in early republican times monopolized the giving of legal advice
and were thereby in a position to control the development of the ius civile.
3

The heres was, to use the expression adopted by Romanist doctrine, a "universal successor" who entered into the whole legal position of the decedent, limited only insofar as two
or more heredes had to share the succession. In contradistinction, a legatee was a person who,
under the terms of a will, received a specific piece of property out of the estate or was entitled
to raise a personal claim against the heres.Legacies could be ordered only after the designation
of a heres or heredes; legacies preceding the inslifutio heredis were ignored, and a will lacking the
designation of an heir was totally void.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

which made them abhor the idea of depriving the heres of his freedom of disposal;
the admission, from the time of Augustus, of the fideicommissum hereditatis,
which practically obliterated the rule, is credited to the realization that "in this
respect Roman liberalism was too radical." If this was so, however, it may be
asked why the effect was not achieved directly by a mere relaxation of the rigid
rule; for throughout the classical period the fideicommissum remained an alien
element, as far as the Roman law of wills was concerned. It might, on the one
hand, be ordered outside of the will proper, while, on the other, it could not be
claimed, like the succession itself, by an ordinary action but only through a special procedure. The question asked is the more legitimate, since military wills
were indeed not subject to the maxim: semel heres semper heres.
It must, therefore, be true, in spite of Schulz's denial, that the origin of the
rules observed, which go back to old times, should be sought in prehistoric conditions when the principles of succession were still determined entirely by those
governing the structure of the Roman family. Neither the ancient poniifices,
with whom these rules originated, nor the republican or classical lawyers, who
clung to them, were motivated by reasons of practical expediency or individualistic liberalism. For the purposes of this review, we may content ourselves with
this negative statement.
These two instances may suffice to illustrate the critical observation made
above. The argument could easily be enlarged by further examples. Speaking in
general terms, it seems to the reviewer that Professor Schulz's approach keeps
hidden from the reader an important aspect of classical Roman jurisprudence.
It is certainly correct that the Roman jurists looked upon life with the eyes of an
economic individualist. It is also true that, as a whole, they possessed a remarkable genius for producing solutions that were desirable from the standpoint of
the type of society in which and for which they worked, while yet occasionally
displaying a stubborn traditionalism regardless of unfair decisions resulting from
it. Nevertheless, the author oversimplifies the historical situation by crediting,
in exaggerated fashion, the bulk of classical institutions to the humanism, liberalism and sense for practical expediency of the classical lawyers and their republican predecessors, while at the same time chiding these jurists for their doctrinaire conservatism. Such attitudes did play a part. But the Romans were not
pragmatists who felt free simply to put into effect policies conceived in accordance with their general social philosophy, only now and then hampered by an
inexplicable inhibition about discarding inherited but obsolete concepts. They
looked upon their law as the old way of life of the Roman people, embodied in
original institutions, in statutes and in inherited forms of action and transaction.
As long as the ius honorariumwas still growing, the praetor might add to this
body of law, even to the point of crowding out, for all practical purposes, the
traditional ius civile. The praetorwas aided in this activity by the jurists, to be
sure. But the main task of the jurists was to apply the law as they found it in
traditional institutions and recognized forms of action and transaction. This
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task offered them great opportunities to display their practical ingenuity, which
they often exercised. But it often set limits for them which they could not
exceed.
This relationship to the materials with which they worked is the clue to both
the progressiveness and the conservatism of the classical lawyers. Much of it was
deeply rooted in the Roman past. In view of the conjectural nature which (because of the almost complete absence of direct sources) attaches to every statement concerning early Roman legal history, Professor Schulz's reluctance to
delve into prehistoric law is understandable. But this situation should not have
induced him simply to deny those roots.
The reviewer has dwelt on these matters at some length because they have a
bearing on the practical use that can be made of Schulz's book in the teaching of
Roman law. The method of the classical jurists, their skill in discovering the
hidden implications of time-honored institutions and a fixed set of forms of action and transaction, is, more than anything else, what gives the Roman law its
lasting didactic value. The somewhat unhistoric character of Professor Schulz's
conception of the classical law has caused parts of his book to fall short of the
goal of providing a guide to students of the Roman method. For the same reason
certain omissions regarding the classical law itself are regrettable. It would have
been desirable, for instance, to have a discussion of the elaborate and highly interesting case law of the Romans concerning negligence in the confines of the
actio legis Aquiliae (a tort action lying for the killing or maiming of slaves and
animals), or of a group of actions (the so-called actiones adiecticiaequalitatis)
created by the praetor in order to overcome the harmful effects of the never-discarded principle of the ius civile denying the possibility of direct agency.
It was the reviewer's duty to point out what he felt was a certain one-sidedness in the author's approach. All the more does he wish to emphasize the general usefulness of Professor Schulz's work both as a basis for further research and
as a text for classroom use. The value of the book lies in its perspicuous presentation of the positive institutions of classical Roman law as a system. In this it
often excels. For special praise, the reviewer would like to single out the admirable chapter on real securities. He would also like to call attention to the
splendid analysis of the social and economic background of the classical law of
hire (p. 544 f.). Frequent comparison of Roman and English law will prove helpful and interesting to readers trained in common law.
For the specialist the book is a comprehensive statement of the views formed
in nearly a half-century of fruitful research by one of the most distinguished
representatives of his field. For the nonspecialist it is a clear and readable introduction to the institutions of Roman law at the time of its highest perfection.
HANs Jurmus WoLET*
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